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The Impact of Parenthood on the Gender Wage Gap –  
a Comparative Analysis of 26 European Countries 
 
Ewa Cukrowska-Torzewska - Anna Lovász 
Abstract  
We use cross-national data on 26 EU countries to assess how much children and the 
responsibilities related to them contribute to the gender wage gap, and how institutional 
elements - especially family policies - affect this relationship. Our analysis is based on a 
decomposition that reveals what portion of the gender wage gap may be attributed to: (1) the 
motherhood wage penalty, (2) the fatherhood wage premium, and (3) the gender wage gap 
among childless individuals. Our findings suggest that the variability in the magnitude of the 
gaps is closely related to the institutional context, pointing to different reasons behind the 
gender wage gap and policy implications. Southern EU countries have low gender wage gaps and 
low motherhood penalties or even premiums. Short leaves, low childcare coverage, and 
traditional norms do not support maternal labor supply, but mothers who work do not face a 
wage penalty. Western EU countries with higher childcare coverage, moderate length leaves, 
supportive norms, and flexible jobs have relatively high maternal employment and mothers are 
not faced with significant wage penalties. The highest motherhood penalties are found in CEE 
countries, where long leaves, low childcare availability under age 3, and preferences for within-
family care lead to long absences from the labor market. In all countries, irrespective of cultural 
norms and policies, we find high positive family gaps among men, which drive men’s average 
wages up, and lead to gender wage inequality. 
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A gyermekvállalás hatása a nemek közötti bérkülönbségre 
– 26 európai ország összehasonlítása alapján 
Cukrowska-Torzewska Ewa, Lovász Anna 
Összefoglaló 
26 EU ország harmonizált adatai alapján azt vizsgáljuk, hogy a gyermekvállalás és ahhoz 
kapcsolódó kötelezettségek hogyan járulnak hozzá a nemek közötti bérkülönbséghez, és hogy az 
intézményi környezet – különösen a családpolitikák – hogyan befolyásolják ezt a kapcsolatot. 
Dekompozíciós eljárás alapján megmutatjuk, hogy a nemek közötti eltérés mekkora részét 
magyarázza: (1) az anyasági bérhátrány, (2) az apasági bérprémium, és (3) a gyermektelenek 
nemek közötti bérkülönbsége. Az eredmények alapján a bérkülönbségek méretének országok 
közötti variabilitása és az intézményi környezet szorosan összefüggnek, a nemek közötti 
bérkülönbség okai és a szakpolitikai következtetések kontextusonként eltérőek. A deli 
országokban alacsony a nemek közötti bérkülönbség és az anyasági bérhátrány, sőt, az anyák 
bérprémiumot kapnak. A rövid anyasági távollét és gyermekellátási lefedettség, valamint a 
tradicionális normák miatt alacsony az anyák foglalkoztatottsága, de azok az anyák, akik 
dolgoznak, nem szenvednek el bérhátrányt. A nyugati országokban - ahol kiterjedtebb a 
gyermekellátás, közepes hosszúságú az anyasági távollét, támogatóak a társadalmi normák, és 
elérhetőek a rugalmas munkaformák – az anyák foglalkoztatottsága viszonylag magas, és a 
bérhátrányuk sem jelentős. A legmagasabb anyaági bérhátrányok a közép-kelet európai 
országokban találhatóak, ahol a hosszú anyasági távollétek, a gyermekellátás alacsony szintje 
(különösen 3 ves kor alatt), és a családon belüli ellátást támogató nézetek hosszú munkapiaci 
kiesésekhez vezetnek. A normáktól és szakpolitikáktól függetlenül minden országban nagy 
apasági bérprémiumokat találunk, amelyek jelentősen hozzájárulnak a nemek közötti 
bérkülönbséghez. 
 
JEL: J13, J22 
Tárgyszavak:
 
Gyermekvállalási bérhátrány, nemek közötti bérkülönbség, családpolitikák 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Previous empirical research reveals that children lead to a wage decline for women and a slight 
wage increase for men. These phenomena are usually referred to as ‘the motherhood wage 
penalty’ and ‘the fatherhood wage premium’, or – more generally – ‘the family wage gaps’. Given 
that parenthood is found to positively affect men’s wages and negatively affect women’s wages, it 
is likely to contribute to the divergence of men’s and women’s average wages, and consequently 
to the formation of the gender wage gap. This link between parenthood, wages, and the overall 
gender pay gap has been indirectly examined in a number of studies, e.g. Dolton and Makepeace 
(1986), Waldfogel (1998), Angelov et al. (2013). In this study, we analyze the relationship 
between parenthood wage gaps and the overall gender wage gap for a large sample of countries, 
and quantify the role of parenthood gaps in determining the gender wage gap. We then compare 
the results across countries and interpret them in light of their most relevant institutional 
characteristics. 
Both topics – the gender wage gap and the family wage gap – have been previously examined 
in a comparative perspective. The variation in the gender gap across the countries has been 
attributed to several factors, including labor market segregation and women’s ability to reach the 
upper end of the wage distribution (Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Shalev, 2009), 
wage setting mechanisms (Blau and Kahn, 2003; Mandel and Semyonov, 2005), institutions, 
including the welfare state and anti-discriminatory laws (Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 
2005; Mandel and Shalev, 2009), women’s lower labor market participation (Olivetti, 
Petrongolo, 2008) and labor market flexibility (Blau and Kahn, 2013; Magda and Potoczna, 
2014). Parenthood wage gaps across the countries have been, in turn, attributed to country-
specific institutional context, especially with regard to family policies and cultural attitudes 
towards the gender division of housework and childcare (e.g. Budig at el, 2012; Boeckmann and 
Budig, 2013). We combine these two lines of research on the wage effects of parenthood and on 
the gender wage gap, and analyze their relationship in a comparative perspective.  
We carry out the analysis for 26 European countries, based on harmonized EU-SILC data 
and a consistent methodology. Our empirical strategy is based on several stages. First, we 
estimate wage equations for men and women, as well as parents and nonparents to derive the 
gaps between (1) mothers and childless women, (2) fathers and childless men, and (3) childless 
men and childless women. We use standard OLS estimation and Dubin and McFadden’s 
selection correction model, (Bourguignon et al. 2007, following Dubin and McFadden, 1984) 
which corrects for selection into employment and parenthood status. In the second step, we use 
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the estimated equations and concentrate on the gender wage gap decomposition, which is based 
on a simple modification of the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (1973). This 
decomposition allows us to derive the relative contribution of the motherhood and fatherhood 
wage gaps, as well as the gender wage gap among childless individuals, to the overall wage gap 
between men and women. Next, we examine the sources of the three gaps by examining the raw 
gaps, the gaps adjusted for observable characteristics, and the unexplained gaps that are also 
adjusted for selection into employment and parenthood. We link the country level estimates to 
data on the institutional context, and draw important new insight regarding the role of such 
policies in the formation of the gender gap. 
Our findings suggest that family policies, cultural norms, and labor market flexibility drive 
clear patterns in how parenthood shapes gender wage inequality. We distinguish between three 
main groups of countries: 1) Southern European countries; 2) Western European countries; and 
3) Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. In the first group, female employment is low, 
and the gender wage gap is relatively small. It is mostly driven by the gender wage gap among 
childless individuals and a positive fatherhood wage gap, while mothers who work receive a 
higher wages compared to childless women. The length of leaves in these countries is short, 
mothers who return to work do so soon after having their child, which does not lead to their 
wage disadvantage relative to childless women. In Western European countries, the gender wage 
gap is mostly attributed to the existence of a significant fatherhood premium. Motherhood wage 
gaps exist but play a marginal role, despite the higher maternal employment rates in these 
countries. Norms and policies enable mothers to combine work and family obligations - 
particularly flexible jobs, access to childcare, and moderate length, well-paid leaves - and upon 
their return to work, they do experience a significant wage penalty. In CEE countries, all three 
gaps – the motherhood and the fatherhood wage gaps, as well as the gender wage gap among 
childless individuals – are significant contributors to gender wage inequality. In these countries, 
the state generally explicitly supports mothers as the primary childcare providers: mothers are 
granted long paid leaves with job protection, institutional childcare under age 3 is scarce, and 
societal views are unsupportive of mothers’ earlier return to work. This leads to many mothers 
returning to work following long career breaks, and higher motherhood wage gaps that play an 
important role in shaping the overall gender wage gap. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the second section, we summarize 
theories and previous empirical evidence related to family gaps in labor supply and wages, their 
role in explaining the gender wage gap, and their relation to the institutional context. We then 
discuss the relevant institutional characteristics of the countries in our sample and their 
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implications regarding the expected parenthood effects. In section three, we present the 
empirical methodology that is used in the cross-country estimation of the family gaps and their 
contribution to the gender wage gap. Section four describes the datasets used in the analysis, 
including descriptive country-level statistics. In section five, we present the main comparative 
country-level results, along with the analysis of the impact of the institutional context on the 
parent and gender wage gaps. In section six we give concluding remarks.  
2. PREVIOUS EVIDENCE AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
2.1 FAMILY GAPS AND THE GENDER WAGE GAP 
The topic of family gaps in the labor supply and wages of men and women has a large literature 
(among others: Browning, 1992; Korenman and Neumark, 1992; Waldfogel, 1997, 1998; 
Lundberg and Rose, 2000, 2002; Budig and England, 2001; Davies and Pierre, 2005). These 
highlight the importance of the impact of parenthood. In terms of the labor supply, the models 
that treat men’s and women’s supply collectively highlight the interdependence between men’s 
and women’s labor supply, especially when there is a child present in the household (Chiappori 
1988, 1992; Blundell et al., 2007). Empirical research and data confirm that mothers’ 
employment is lower than that of childless women, and fathers’ employment is higher than that 
of childless men (OECD, 2004, Boeckmann, Misra, and Budig 2015; Keck and Saraceno 2013). 
In this study, our focus is on wage gaps, however, the impact of parenthood and institutional 
elements on employment also affect parent and gender wage gaps, and therefore need to be 
taken into consideration. 
In terms of wage effects, women are generally found to be penalized for motherhood in the 
form of lower wages, whereas fathers tend to receive a wage premium. The motherhood wage 
penalty is usually explained using the framework of human capital theory (mothers experience 
career breaks and a lower accumulation of work experience), work-effort theory (mothers exert 
less effort at work due to child-related responsibilities) and specialization (mothers are 
specializing into home production), the theory of compensating wage differentials (mothers 
choose “mother friendly” jobs and sectors), or unobserved heterogeneity (women who decide to 
have children differ from childless women in unobserved factors that also affect wages) and 
discrimination (lower wages due to employers’ discrimination). The fatherhood wage premium is 
in turn attributed to men’s increased specialization in the labor market, unobserved factors that 
lead to the increased productivity of fathers, and employers’ positive discrimination due to a 
high social value assigned to fatherhood.   
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Previous research documents the lower wages of mothers compared to childless women for 
numerous countries. The size of the estimated gaps varies and ranges from small penalties in 
Sweden, Norway, Belgium, and France (0% and 1.5%; Datta Gupta and Smith, 2002; Davies and 
Pierre, 2005), moderate negative effects in Denmark, Spain, and Portugal  (3% to  6.5%; 
Simonsen and Skipper, 2006; Nielsen et al., 2004; Davies and Pierre, 2005) as well as the US 
(Waldfogel, 1998), to high negative effects of children on women’s wages found in the UK and 
Germany (12 to 30%; Davies and Pierre, 2005; Gangl and Ziefle, 2009).1 An extensive overview 
of empirical works on this topic has been recently provided by Nizalova et al. (2016), who 
investigates the motherhood wage penalty in the Ukraine. At the same time, a positive premium 
due to fatherhood has been documented for men in the US (from 4 to 9%, Waldfogel, 1998, 
Lundberg and Rose, 2000, 2002), Norway (from 1 to 6% depending on the number of children, 
Petersen et al., 2012), and Hungary and Poland (Cukrowska-Torzewska and Lovasz, 2016).  
Despite the growing literature on the topic, there are only a few studies that focus on the 
contribution of the family gaps to the overall gender wage gap. This is the case in spite of the fact 
that biological and cultural differences between the genders related to childbearing are clearly an 
important determinant (Hersch, 2006). For example, Dolton and Makepeace (1986) argued that 
individual decisions regarding employment as well as the wages received from work may differ 
for married and single individuals, and for individuals who have and do not have children. 
Waldfogel (1998) also argued that the family gaps and the gender wage gap are related. Recently, 
Angelov et al. (2013) examined the within couple gender wage gap in Sweden, and found that 
fifteen years after the birth of the first child, the male-female wage gap has increased by around 
10 percentage points.  
In a recent analysis, Cukrowska-Torzewska and Lovasz (2016) provide direct evidence on the 
relationship between the wage gaps that arise due to parenthood and the total gender wage gap, 
based on an empirical method that correct for the major selection biases present in the 
estimation, for two countries, Hungary and Poland. The main findings indicate that the 
fatherhood premium is a main contributor to the gender wage gap in these two countries, and 
that the motherhood penalty is also significant, while the gender wage gap among childless 
individuals plays a smaller role. A comparison of these estimates between the two countries and 
compared to previous studies from other countries points to a dependence on the particular 
institutional context. The motherhood penalty is higher when family policies are not supportive 
of maternal employment at young child ages, and the fatherhood premium appears to be higher 
                                                 
1 The results differ in the definition of the motherhood penalty, which may be considered as the effect of at 
least one child (motherhood in general), one child, two or three and more children. 
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when cultural views are relatively more traditional. In this paper, we estimate the magnitudes 
and contributions for 26 EU countries, using a harmonized dataset and the same methodology. 
This offers us the opportunity to compare estimates from a wide variety of institutional settings, 
and infer their impact on the composition of the overall gender wage gap. 
2.2 THE ROLE OF THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
Contrary to previous comparative research, the goal of this paper is to study not only how the 
institutional context affects the magnitudes of the gender and family wage gaps, but also how it 
affects the relative role of parenthood in shaping the gender wage gap. We therefore consider the 
most important institutional factors affecting family gaps, as highlighted in previous studies: key 
family policies, labor market flexibility, and cultural attitudes. We discuss both the direct effects 
of these policies on wages, as well as their indirect effects through selection into employment and 
parenthood.  
Family policies that are most often considered in this line of empirical research are the length 
of paid maternity leave and parental leave and childcare coverage. The length of the child-related 
leave available to mothers affects how long mothers are absent from the labor market, and 
thereby, their wages.
2
 Previous evidence suggests that long leaves decrease women’s 
employment continuity, leading to longer career interruptions, and consequently, the lower 
average wage of mothers once they return to work (Buligescu et al., 2009). Moderately long 
leaves, in turn, are likely to reduce family gaps, as they allow mothers to balance their 
attachments to both the labor market and their family (Budig et al., 2012). Short maternity 
leaves (or no leave) may cause mothers to decide to stay at home with their child and leave the 
labor market indefinitely, which may also lead to a higher family gap if they return to work later 
on for lower wages. Leaves also impact family gaps indirectly through decisions regarding 
employment as well as parenthood, i.e. the selection of individuals into these groups. Waldfogel 
et al. (1999) show that short leaves incent lower educated women who earn low wages to drop 
out of the labor market following childbirth, which may decrease the family gap. In the case of 
long but unpaid leaves, the opposite applies, since low paid women may not be able to afford to 
stay home (Lapuerta et al., 2011). Keck and Saraceno (2013) argue that short maternity leaves 
may have a negative impact on parenthood choices by discouraging women who earn high wages 
                                                 
2 We focus on total child-related leave available to mothers, which includes maternity leave as well as 
parental leave not reserved for fathers. Parental leave is usually available to both parents, so parental leave 
regulations may have an effect on the labor market outcomes of not only women, but also men. OECD 
statistics for 2013 show however that except for Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway, Denmark and 
Finland) as well as Portugal, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Germany, the percentage of men who use 
parental leave is rather low and it is predominantly used by women.  
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from having children, leading to a greater family gap in wages. The effect of leaves on the family 
gap is therefore also dependent on these selection mechanisms. 
The accessibility of public childcare is also an important factor. Easily accessible childcare is 
found to affect the labor market participation and the work continuity of women positively 
(Pettit and Hook, 2005), leading to a lower motherhood penalty. Childcare availability may, 
however, also indirectly affect the family gap through selection by individual characteristics, as it 
is an important factor in determining whether a woman returns to work. In particular, when 
public childcare is limited and private care is costly, low paid women may be more likely to drop 
out of the labor market. This may lead to a lower family gap, as mothers who work are generally 
higher earners. The availability of childcare – as well as part-time opportunities - has also been 
shown to increase the probability of having a child (Del Boca 2002). 
Labor market flexibility is also considered a key determinant, since mothers, especially those 
with young children, may find it more difficult to return to full time positions, or may prefer a 
more gradual separation from their child. On the one hand, flexible labor markets allow women 
to combine work with family responsibilities, increasing their labor supply, but on the other 
hand, this may be costly and lead to lower wages (Hirsch, 2005). Several studies find a negative 
part-time wage penalty among women (e.g. Gregory and Conolly, 2008; Manning and 
Petrongolo, 2008; Bardasi and Gornick, 2008). Since mothers more than childless women are 
likely to work part-time, part-time employment and other work adjustments have been found to 
explain part of the wage penalty incurred by mothers (e.g. Waldfogel, 1997; Joshi et al., 1999; 
Budig and England, 2001).  
Cultural norms have also been found to impact motherhood related inequalities in wages. 
Davies and Pierre (2005) report the size of the wage penalty incurred by mothers for a number of 
European countries, suggesting that family policies and cultural attitudes are likely to explain 
revealed country-level variation. Budig et al. (2012) not only report the estimates of the family 
gap in wages for women, but also test these explanations. Their research reveals that there is an 
interaction effect of policies and culture, so that the effect of policies depends on the perception 
of women’s employment and their caring role in the family. Boeckmann and Budig (2013) 
analyze cross country wage inequalities due to fatherhood and link the findings to cultural 
indicators that aim to capture attitudes towards men’s and women’s employment and caring 
responsibilities. In countries where men are still regarded the primary breadwinners, men who 
have children are more likely to work harder and longer hours once they become parents in 
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order to ensure their family’s financial stability. In such traditional countries, the wage premium 
from fatherhood may be very high.
3
  
Family policies and cultural perceptions of women’s roles in a society can affect not only the 
situation of working mothers, but also the situation of women who remain childless. When there 
are generous family policies paired with a traditional perception of women that translate into the 
societal expectation that after giving birth women should stay home with their child for a long 
time period, employers may also discriminate childless women due to expectations that they may 
have children in the future and the costs associated with their long absences. An institutional 
context may have a ‘spill-over’ effect that affects not only mothers, but all women, regardless of 
the number of children they have. Mandel and Semyonov (2005) argue that mothers are much 
more likely to use parental leave than fathers, and thus employers who do not have information 
regarding the fertility plans of a childless female employee may refrain from hiring and 
promoting them. As a consequence, in countries where the institutional context supports the 
model of women as the main provider of care within the family, childless women may also earn 
less compared to childless men.   
Table 1 summarizes the main relevant institutional characteristics of the countries in our 
analysis. In particular, we report institutional variables that refer to the labor market and its 
flexibility, indicators that pertain to gender norms, and selected family policies measures. The 
data refer to policies for the years 2004-2013, that roughly correspond to the years studied in the 
empirical analysis. Policy changes over the period are noted below the table. Based on some 
general tendencies shown in this table, we distinguish between three main groups of countries 
characterized by similar contexts, and derive hypotheses regarding the expected magnitudes of 
the gaps and their contribution to the gender wage gap. In our discussion of the estimation 
results, we mainly focus on these groups, however, we also note any significant variation among 
countries within groups. 
First, there is a group of Southern European countries (group A) that is characterized by 
relatively low female employment and strong traditional gender norms. This group includes 
Italy, Greece, and Spain. The family policies of these countries vary, but are generally 
characterized by relatively short leaves (especially Spain), and, in some cases, childcare coverage 
rates below those seen in Western European countries for ages 0-3 (Italy, Greece) and for ages 3-
                                                 
3 While the length of leave reserved specifically for fathers is generally low in most countries - with the 
exception of some Western European countries - it may also be seen as reflecting existing cultural 
expectations regarding gender roles and the government’s commitment to achieving greater gender 
equality. 
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6 (Greece). The availability of part-time work in group A countries is generally lower than seen in 
Western European countries.  
The second group of countries consists mostly of Western European countries (group B). 
This group is characterized by more gender equal cultural views, higher female employment, 
relatively high labor market flexibility, as well as high childcare accessibility and the availability 
of paid leaves of moderate length. Using the terminology of Leitner (2003), such a combination 
of family policies may be referred to as optional familialism, since the state gives mothers an 
option to choose to either provide childcare within the family using available leaves, or to 
transfer care outside of the family to institutions. The two exceptions within the group in this 
respect are the UK and Ireland, where no paid parental leave is available; the length of maternity 
leave for mothers is however relatively long here, meaning that it may partially take over the role 
of parental leave policy. Anglo-Saxon countries are perceived as providing mothers less of 
institutional incentives to combine work and family duties (Baranowska-Rataj and Matysiak 
2016; Matysiak and Weziak-Bialowolska 2016). The notable exceptions are also Portugal and 
Slovenia, which geographically and historically are close to Southern European countries 
(Portugal) and Central Europe (Slovenia). Portugal differs, however, from other Southern 
European countries, because of much stronger engagement of women in the labor market 
(Guerreiro, 2014); yet the society perception of women’s role is much more traditional here than 
in other Western European countries. Slovenia in turn differs from Central and Eastern 
European countries with respect to family policies – in particular, the leaves are much shorter 
and the childcare coverage is greater in this country.  
The last group of countries consists of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries (group 
C). It also includes Austria and Germany. The distinct feature of this group is that there is 
limited childcare assistance for small children aged 0-3 (in the form of formal care in public and 
private institutions) and relatively long parental and maternity leaves for mothers. This 
coexistence of long leaves and a low availability of institutional childcare may be characterized as 
explicitly supporting the family in its caring role (Leitner, 2003). Poland may be perceived as yet 
another exception, because for the years 2005-2012 it did not provide any paid parental leave. 
This changed in 2013, since then, there is 26 weeks of paid parental leave available, and since 
2016, 32 weeks. In this group, we also observe strong traditional views regarding the gender 
division of labor and the provision of childcare within the family, which is strongly related to 
institutional characteristics. Women’s labor market attachment and flexible work forms are also 
relatively limited in availability compared to western EU countries. 
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Table 1. 
 Institutional variables by country  
Indicator 
GDP 
Employment 
to population 
ratio 
Part-time 
employment 
Overall 
men are 
less 
competent 
than 
women to 
perform 
household 
tasks  
A father 
must put 
his career 
ahead of 
looking 
after his 
young 
child  
Length of paid leave 
Childcare 
coverage 
Familization of policies 
Per capita 
($) 
Female 
(%) 
Male 
(%) 
Female 
(%) 
Male 
(%) 
Total 
(weeks) 
Maternity 
leave 
(weeks) 
Parental 
leave 
(weeks) 
Home 
care 
leave 
Leave 
reserved 
for fathers 
(including 
paternity 
leave; 
weeks) 
Aged 
0-3 
Aged 
3-6 
Type 
Source World Bank Eurostat Eurobarometer OECD + Multilinks Eurostat Leitner (2003) 
Greece* 26868 46 69 11 4 55% 30% 34.3 34.3 0.0 0.0 0.4 12.3 67.9 explicit 
Italy 36324 46 68 28 13 71% 43% 47.7 21.7 26.0 0.0 0.0 24.3 90.9 optional 
Spain 30899 53 68 23 5 58% 35% 16.0 16.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 36.9 91.3 defamilization 
Belgium* 44024 56 68 42 8 36% 26% 28.9 15.0 13.9 0.0 15.9 41.3 98.7 optional 
Denmark 59010 72 78 36 14 22% 14% 64.0 18.0 46.0 0.0 2.0 71.9 94.2 optional 
Finland 46568 68 71 19 9 37% 23% 159.0 17.5 24.3 117.2 7.4 27.0 77.0 optional 
France 40917 59 69 30 6 31% 14% 42.0 16.0 26.0 0.0 2.0 36.9 94.4 optional 
Iceland 43438 79 84 34 10 N/A N/A 26.0 13.0 13.0 0.0 13.0 40.2 97.2 optional 
Ireland* 50103 57 70 33 10 54% 31% 24.0 24.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.6 85.7 defamilization 
Netherlands* 49995 69 81 76 24 20% 16% 29.0 16.0 13.0 0.0 13.4 45.8 88.9 defamilization/ optional 
Norway* 88788 73 78 43 14 N/A N/A 142.5 9.0 37.7 95.8 10.3 39.0 83.2 optional 
Portugal* 22152 61 70 16 8 57% 24% 26.7 11.2 15.6 0.0 13.6 33.7 74.4 defamilization/ optional 
Sweden 51693 71 75 40 13 30% 6% 67.0 15.6 51.4 0.0 10.0 51.8 92.7 optional 
Slovenia 23447 62 70 12 7 47% 25% 52.3 15.0 37.3 0.0 18.0 32.8 86.9 optional 
United Kingdom* 39533 65 76 42 11 37% 25% 34.7 34.7 0.0 0.0 2.0 32.9 84.9 defamilization 
Austria 46513 64 75 42 8 58% 41% 138.0 16.0 122.0 0.0 16.5 8.9 75.8 explicit 
Bulgaria* 6833 57 64 3 2 66% 38% 114.2 35.3 79.0 0.0 2.0 9.5 66.4 explicit 
Czech Rep. 19638 57 74 9 2 51% 35% 214.0 28.0 186.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 70.6 explicit 
Estonia 15675 64 69 12 5 38% 21% 162.1 20.0 142.1 0.0 2.0 17.8 87.6 explicit 
Germany 42026 66 76 45 8 52% 26% 110.0 14.0 96.0 0.0 6.7 20.6 89.2 optional 
Hungary 13320 51 62 7 4 71% 48% 160.0 24.0 84.0 52.0 1.0 8.0 77.1 explicit 
Latvia 12377 62 66 10 6 56% 39% 121.3 16.0 79.0 26.3 2.0 17.7 68.9 explicit 
Lithuania 12543 61 63 10 7 52% 26% 114.5 18.0 96.5 0.0 6.0 10.4 63.9 explicit 
Poland* 12074 51 64 12 6 57% 40% 23.1 20.2 2.9 0.0 0.7 3.1 35.8 implicit/explicit 
Romania 8475 53 66 11 9 63% 37% 114.0 18.0 96.0 0.0 1.0 7.0 55.9 explicit 
Slovak Rep. 16051 53 67 5 2 51% 48% 164.0 30.0 134.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 71.4 explicit 
Notes: 1. Data on institutional and family policies (columns 1-5 and 8-14) represent mean values for the years 2004=2013; culture indicators (columns 6-7) represent data from Eurobarometer 
survey from 2014; familization type (column 15) assigned consistently with Leitner (2003) based on the availability of paid parental leave and childcare coverage rate for children aged 0-3. 2. 
Countries, in which there was a change in leave policies are marked with an asterisk. Following changes were observed: Greece – an extension of paid maternity leave in 2008 from 17 weeks to 43 
weeks, Belgium – an extension of paid parental leave in 2012 from 13 weeks to 17.3 weeks; Ireland – extensions of paid maternity leave in 2006 from 18 weeks to 22 weeks and in 2007 from 22 
weeks to 26 weeks, Netherlands – an introduction of paid parental leave of 26 weeks in 2009, Norway – a reduction of paid parental leave in 2009 from 39 weeks to 37 weeks and in 2011 from 37 
weeks to 36 weeks, Portugal – an introduction of paid parental leave of 28 weeks in 2009 and a reduction of paid maternity leave from 17.1 weeks to 6.4 weeks in 2009, Bulgaria – a reduction of 
paid parental leave in 2010 from 92.1 weeks to 65.8 weeks and an extension of paid maternity leave in 2009 from 19 weeks to 45 weeks, Poland – an introduction of paid parental leave of 26 weeks 
in 2013 and an extension of maternity leave in 2007 from 16 weeks to 18 weeks, in 2009 from 18 weeks to 20 weeks, in 2010 from 20 weeks to 22 weeks, 2012 from 22 weeks to 24 weeks and in 
2013 from 24 weeks to 26 weeks.  
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Based on the reviewed theoretical considerations and the institutional characteristics of the 
countries, we expect to find relatively high motherhood penalties in the CEE countries, as well as 
Germany and Austria (Group C).4 Here, existing family policies explicitly support women acting 
as the main providers of childcare for young children, and cultural norms reinforce this 
expectation. This leads to long absences from the labor market, paired with relatively high 
maternal employment at older child ages, and therefore, a negative parent gap among women. In 
the case of the Western European countries that provide women more options in the form of 
paid, moderate length leaves, as well as a high availability of institutional childcare, we expect 
the family wage gap to be relatively smaller, as mothers return to work more easily and quickly 
following the birth of their child. The high availability of flexible work also enables mothers to 
return more quickly but may increase the motherhood penalty due to lower wages paid in these 
jobs. In Southern European countries, short leaves and lower childcare availability, coupled with 
traditional views and less flexible work leads to many mothers dropping out of the labor market 
permanently. Mothers who return to work do so relatively soon after they have a child, and may 
be a select group of higher-skill or more motivated individuals, which would lead to a smaller or 
even positive family gap among women. On the other hand, if higher-skilled women are more 
likely to opt not to have children, the parent gap may be larger in magnitude (more negative). 
Generally, we expect the wage advantage of fathers relative to childless men to be greater in 
countries where traditional cultural and gender norms are sustained. Thus, we expect to find 
higher positive family gaps among men in the groups of Southern and Central and Eastern 
European countries. 
Given these expectations regarding the size of the family wage gaps, we expect to see 
relatively high gender wage gaps in CEE countries driven by women receiving a wage penalty for 
parenthood and men receiving a wage premium for it. On the other hand, the expectation of 
small family wage gaps among men and women in Western European countries makes us 
anticipate smaller overall gender wage gaps as well. In Southern European countries, we expect 
relatively low family gaps among women. Low gender wage gaps are more driven by fatherhood 
premia, mothers are not penalized in wages, however, their employment is low. 
                                                 
4 The family gaps for CEE countries have been reported in Cukrowska-Torzewska (2017). These estimates 
are based on longitudinal EU SILC data and rely on fixed effects models, which compare women’s wages 
before and after the childbirth. The results reveal no significant negative motherhood wage gaps in CEE 
countries. This finding is, however, to arise as a consequence of the data structure, and in particular 
collecting the data for few years in relations to the leaves period. The reported gaps therefore reflect a 
short-term wage decline caused by motherhood. As opposed to the present research, these estimates also 
do not correct for women’s choice whether to return to work or not (selection to employment).  
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3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
The estimation and decomposition methodology used here was applied earlier in Cukrowska-
Torzewska and Lovasz (2016). We follow that study closely here in the two main steps: the 
estimation of the wage gaps and the decomposition of the gender wage gap. 
3.1 MODELING THE WAGE EQUATIONS  
From a methodological point of view, the analysis of the gender wage gap and the family gap is 
not trivial, since not all the individuals decide to have children and work, and these decisions 
may be related to unobservable factors that influence wages as well. Most often the previous 
literature on family gaps deals with only one of these selection concerns. As a result, the obtained 
estimates corrected for employment selection are still likely to be biased if individuals self-select 
into parenthood, and the estimates that correct for parenthood selection are biased due to non-
randomness of the working sample population. We treat these two selection processes jointly 
and apply the multinomial correction model proposed by Dubin and McFadden (1984) when 
estimating wage equations. This model has desirable properties and it is preferred to other 
selection models that involve several alternatives, such as Lee’s (1983) or Dahl’s models (2002), 
(see Bourguignon et al., 2007).5  
Similarly to other selection models, Dubin’s and McFadden’s model (hereafter DMF) relies 
on two stage estimation procedure. In the first stage, individuals choose their particular 
employment-parenthood status out of four possible alternatives (s= {1,2,3,4}), i.e. being: (1) a 
working parent, (2) a working non-parent, (3) a non-working parent and (4) a non-working non-
parent. This choice is modeled by a multinomial logit model. In our framework, the analysis is 
performed separately for men and women. Then, the wage equation conditional on choosing s=1 
is: 
          (1)  
Where subscript j={f,m} refers to females (f) and males (m),  is the predicted probability 
that alternative s is preferred and  denotes correlation coefficient between the error terms 
from the first stage multinomial logit and wage equations. Because in our framework individuals 
choose from four alternatives, the wage equation for each alternative includes three correction 
                                                 
5 For details regarding the application of Dubin’s and McFadden’s multiple selection model to the analysis 
of wages by parenthood status see Cukrowska-Torzewska and Lovasz (2016).  
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terms referring to the remaining alternative choices. The coefficient that is estimated on a given 
correction term reflects the correlation between unobservable factors that influence wages in the 
selected employment-parenthood combination, and unobservable factors that influence the 
choice of the alternative. The sign of the estimated coefficients therefore indicates the direction 
of the relation between unobservable factors. For example, a negative coefficient related to 
alternative s in wage equation s+1 shows a downward bias of wages in s+1 that arises because 
individuals with better unobserved skills are more likely to choose alternative s than s+1. 
We control for several variables in the wage equations, namely education, the age of 
individuals, and marital status. We do not account for occupation or sector of work, since these 
may be endogenous in the wage equation and correlated with the decision on parenthood. In 
addition to individual characteristics, we also control for regional disparities and include the size 
of the place of residence in terms of the total number of inhabitants and the region. The question 
of what controls to include is not straightforward, and affects the interpretation of the explained 
and unexplained portions of the wage gaps, discussed in the next section. When controls are 
included, they are not considered to be a consequence of parenthood, but an exogenous factor. 
We do not control for experience, which means that the adjusted gap we measure also includes 
the effect of lost experience related to absences due to parenthood. In the case of experience, it is 
easy to see that parenthood has an effect, lowering the experience of mothers due to their 
absence from the labor market.  
The identification of the model requires valid exclusion restrictions, that is, variables that are 
included in the estimation of the first stage multinomial logit model but are excluded from the 
wage regression. Given the data, we use a set of exclusion restrictions that have been previously 
adapted in similar research (Joshi et al., 1999, Cukrowska-Torzewska and Lovasz, 2016): an 
indicator whether an individual has a spouse who is employed, the age of the spouse, the total 
number of individuals living in the household, and variables on housing conditions (the total 
number of rooms).6 Having a spouse that is employed is expected to decrease the employment 
propensity for women and increase it for men. Similarly, we expect that living in a bigger 
household may cause women to decide to stay at home to take care of the household members, 
whereas for men it might be an incentive for providing financial security of the family. We expect 
that living with parents and having a spouse that is employed increases the probability of 
parenthood. Empirical research has shown that childcare by a grandparent is common, 
                                                 
6 The choice of exclusion restrictions is largely limited by data availability. Other variables that could be 
used but are either entire unavailable or missing for certain countries include for example: non-labor 
income of the household, housing tenure, variables indicating family values and attitudes at the age of 16 
(e.g. Korenman and Neumark, 1992, Joshi et al., 1999).  
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especially when formal childcare is limited (Jappens and Van Bavel, 2012), so living with a 
parent may assure “free” child care, and serve as a positive incentive for entering the 
parenthood. Finally, we anticipate that better housing conditions, measures by the number of 
rooms, will also cause individuals to be more willing to have a child.  
A potential weakness of our analysis is that the strength of the exclusion variables used may 
be low. In this respect, however, we are limited by data availability. While interpreting the 
results, we thus keep in mind that we may not be capturing all of the selection that takes place 
based on unobserved characteristics. Additionally, it should be clear that we correct for both 
types of selection simultaneously, and can eventually only infer which is the dominant selection 
process. For example, it is plausible that employment selection is positive (better paid and better 
motivated women come back to work) so that the negative family gap is likely to be 
underestimated, and selection into motherhood is negative (lower paid, less motivated women 
decide to have kids), so that the family gap is likely to be overestimated, but we observe the 
adjustment of the family gap only in the direction that is dominant  
3.2  DECOMPOSING THE GENDER WAGE GAP THAT ACCOUNTS FOR THE PARENTHOOD  
To assess the role of family wage gaps in the formation of the overall gender wage inequality, we 
adapt an extension of the standard gender wage gap decomposition commonly referred to as the 
Oaxaca-Blinder mean decomposition (1973). Using this method we portion the difference in 
men’s and women’s averages wages into three main components: 1) the family gap among 
women; 2) the family gap among men, and 3) the gender wage gap among childless individuals. 
Denoting the separate wage equation for parents and non-parents as: 
             (2) 
Where c = {CH, NCH} refers to two observed states of employment and parenthood status (CH - 
being working parent and NCH - being working non-parent), and j = {f, m} refer to females and 
males, the gender wage gap may be decomposed as follows: 
   (3) 
Note that when women are penalized for motherhood (the family wage gap among mothers is 
negative) then this contributes positively towards the formation of the overall gender wage gap. 
Similarly, when men receive premium associated with fatherhood, the premium drives men’s 
average wages up, contributing towards larger gender wage inequality.  
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Using standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method each of the three components may be 
additionally decomposed into explained (endowment) and unexplained (remuneration) 
components. Since the wage equations are corrected for selections, among the explanatory 
variables we additionally have correction terms, which may be either treated as a separate 
component of the decomposition or subtracted from both sides of the estimated equation 
(Neuman and Oaxaca, 2004). In our analysis, we interpret the selection terms as an additional 
selection component representing the part of the gap that is due to the difference in selection 
patterns.   
When evaluating the hypotheses derived in the previous section, we first analyze the raw gap 
estimates’ magnitudes and contributions. The raw gaps are defined as differences in mean wages 
between two groups (i.e. mothers vs. non-mothers, fathers vs. non-fathers, childless women vs. 
childless men). These gaps reflect the wage inequality that arises due to: (1) demographic 
differences between the groups; (2) selection into employment and parenthood status; (3) 
unobserved differences between the groups. We then distinguish between the raw gap and the 
gap adjusted for demographic characteristics, and analyze the adjusted gap in relation to family 
policies and cultural attitudes. To do so, instead of decomposing the gaps using the estimates 
from the DMF model, we use the estimates from standard OLS wage equations that control for 
age, education, marital status, regions, urbanization, and years. The adjusted gap is the 
unexplained portion of the raw gap in wages obtained from Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
applied to the wage equations estimated using OLS method.  
In the case of women, the adjusted gap represents the gap that arises as a consequence of 
both direct and indirect effects of policies and culture. The indirect effects are realized through 
women’s decisions regarding work and childrearing, which we refer to as selection. For example, 
long leaves may discourage women who are better paid and more motivated to work from having 
children, because such women may expect that long employment breaks will translate into lower 
promotion prospects and lower positions in the workplace. Similarly, societal perceptions that 
mothers should stay home with a child for a long period after giving birth may affect women’s 
decision to come back to work. Direct effects, in turn, include the impact of employment breaks 
due to childbearing, mothers’ decreased productivity after such breaks, and employers’ 
discrimination.  
To distinguish between these two channels, we further examine the gaps that are 
decomposed into the explained part, the part that is due to selection, and the unexplained gap 
that remains after adjusting for both, using the results obtained from the DMF model. In our set-
up, the indirect effects will thus be reflected in the part of the gap that can be attributed to 
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selection, and the direct effects will be reflected in the part of the gap that remains once we 
adjust the raw gap for demographics and selection. The part of the gap that remains after 
adjusting for demographics and selection is the unexplained portion of the gap that is obtained 
from the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition performed on wage equations estimated using the DMF 
model.  
In the case of men, the interpretation of the gaps is slightly more straightforward, because 
family policies and cultural context should not affect men’s selection into employment and 
parenthood in a substantial way. We thus interpret the unexplained part of the family gap among 
men as the gap that most closely reflects the effects of cultural attitudes (e.g. positive 
discrimination due to employers favoring fathers).  
4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
We use the data from the EU-SILC cross-sectional dataset, which is a large data collection 
distributed by Eurostat for selected European countries. We use data that is available for the 
years 2004-2013, the exact time span, however, varies by country.7 Since 2005, the dataset 
additionally covers Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and nine of the then ten new EU Member 
States (all except for Estonia). Since 2006 data collection is also carried out in Bulgaria and 
Turkey and since 2007 in Romania and Switzerland. We carry out the analysis for 26 countries: 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK. We drop 
Luxembourg, Turkey, Switzerland, as well as Cyprus and Malta from the sample as their sample 
sizes are relatively low. 
The primary goal of this survey is to collect nationally representative, harmonized data 
regarding detailed information on individual and household level incomes (wage and non-labor 
income) and spending (exact amounts spent on various goods). Moreover, the database contains 
the main demographic characteristics of the respondents (gender, age, education), labor market 
status details (activity, details of current and previous employment), their family situation (i.e. 
marital status, number of children, the age of the children, total household size, etc.), and home 
environment (characteristics of the home, durable goods, and location). Spouses and children – 
                                                 
7 Countries for which all years are available include: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. 
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and therefore their characteristics - are linked to each other based on individual and household 
identification codes.  
In the analysis, we consider only employed individuals who are not self-employed, are not 
studying, and are of working age. We further restrict the sample to individuals aged at most 45 - 
due to the data limitations which we discuss below. As we are interested in deriving the relative 
contribution of the parent gaps to the gender wage gap, we also restrict the sample to individuals 
who are at least 25 years old, when the sample is likely to include parents and non-parents. 
Additionally, we exclude individuals who are employed in agriculture, since their earnings are 
subject to high fluctuations.  
The principal focus of our analysis is a variable that indicates the presence of a child. Since 
the aim of this research is to reveal what portion of the gender wage gap may be assigned to 
gender specific wage gap that arises due to parenthood, we concentrate on whether an individual 
has a child or not, and we do not account for the exact number of children. The EU-SILC dataset 
does not provide a direct indicator for the parenthood status; it is, however, possible to derive it 
using information the indicators assigning the relations within the family, as well as the variables 
indicating the id of a mother and a father. We thus first derive the variable indicating whether an 
individual is a child, and then assign children to parents using information on the relations 
within the family and variables indicating the id of a mother and a father. A parent is defined as 
an individual who has at least one child living in the same household who is at most 25 years old. 
Because we examine parents of children aged 0-25, rather than examining the immediate effects 
of parenthood, our estimates pertain to long-run effects. 
As has been shown by Greulich and Dasré (2017) the parenthood status derived with the use 
of EU SILC data and the procedure outlined above carries a bias, as older parents, whose 
children have moved to another household, are treated as childless. In particular, Greulich and 
Dasré (2017) show that the number of children reported in EU SILC systematically declines for 
individuals aged 40 and older. To address this issue we thus decide to drop from our sample 
individuals who are older than 45 years.8  
Appendix Table A.1 summarizes the number of observations of individuals for each country 
in our sample. Additionally, the table gives the share of employed by gender, and the share of 
parents. The respective shares in the intersections of these categories used in the multinomial 
logit specification are shown in Appendix Table A.2. These show that sample sizes differ across 
                                                 
8 We keep in our sample individuals aged 40-45, as for the sample aged 25-40 we observe very high shares 
of parents and insufficient number of observations on childless individuals. As shown by Greulich and 
Dasré (2017) measurement bias in the number of children of women aged 38-44 in SILC is around -10% 
on average. 
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the analyzed countries; the smallest sample size is reported for Iceland (10,924), whereas the 
greatest for Italy (48,653). The share of sample that is working for a wage varies among the 
analyzed countries and ranges from around 50-60 to 80-90. The shares of parents, both among 
men and women, oscillate around 70-90%. The investigation of the intersection of this categories 
by gender reveals that women, both mothers and childless, are more likely than men – fathers 
and childless – not to work.  
The dependent variable in our analysis is the natural logarithm of hourly wage. There are two 
measures of earnings available in the dataset: 1) earnings received during an income reference 
period (IRF), which for most of the countries is a calendar year proceeding the interview, and 2) 
monthly earnings at the time of the interview.9 Unfortunately, both measures of earnings are not 
available for all countries, for some only the first variable is reported. On the other hand, data on 
working time (hours of work), which would allow us to derive an hourly wage rate, refer to the 
usual hours worked per week at the time of the interview. Given the data structure, we derive 
hourly wage based on the re-calculated monthly earnings, using information on earnings 
received during the IRF, the number of months spent in full-time and part-time employment 
during the IFR, and the reported working time.10  
Summary statistics of wages in the countries in our sample by gender and parental status are 
given in Appendix Table A.3. Wages are expressed in real terms in EUR. The table gives average 
wages by gender and parent status, as well as the average number of hours worked by each 
group. These show that in most countries, men that have children receive slightly greater wages 
than childless men, but also work slightly longer working hours. For women, the opposite 
pattern is observed: in more than half of countries women who have children receive lower 
wages, but in almost all countries they work a slightly shorter time than women with no children.  
Detailed summary statistics of the control variables in the wage equations are presented in 
Appendix Table A.4., by gender and country. We include marital status, age, the level of 
education of individuals, which is defined in accordance with the ISCED classification, 11 
                                                 
9 For some countries income reference period is defined as 12 months preceding the interview. 
10 We consider only individuals, who during the IRF period were either full-time or part-time employed, 
but not both. We then use working hours to calculate hourly wage only if an individual has been working 
full-time or part-time during the entire IRF and continues to work in the same working schedule while 
being interviewed (i.e. when information on usual working hours is collected).     
11 ISCED (International Standard Classifications of Education) distinguishes between different levels of 
education and assigns detailed description to each level. The lowest level is ISCED 1, which is primary 
education that usually starts at age of 6 and lasts between 4 to 6 years. ISCED 2 stands for lower secondary 
education that follows primary education and usually lasts between four to six years. ISCED 3 follows 
ISCED 2 and lasts between two to five years – students usually leave this level of education at age 17 to 20. 
Finally ISCED 4 refers to post-secondary but not tertiary education and ISCED 5 and higher for different levels 
of tertiary education.  
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geographical variables capturing the density of the population of the place of living and the 
region of the country, as well as year fixed effects. To evaluate the impact of institutional context, 
and different family policies in particular, on the family gap and its role in the gender wage gap, 
we link country-level information to the EU-SILC data. We use institutional data coming from 
several sources as presented in Table 1.  
5. RESULTS 
5.1 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE FAMILY GAPS TO THE GENDER WAGE GAP 
The main focus of our analysis is on the relative contributions of the gaps that arise because of 
the parenthood status to the overall gender gap. These results are depicted in Figure 1. Detailed 
decomposition results are presented in Appendix Table A.5. For comparison purposes, the 
countries in each group are sorted based on the size of the gender wage gap.  
The results show that for the southern EU countries in group A, the largest contributors to 
the overall gender gap are the positive wage gap due to fatherhood, and the gender wage gap 
observed among childless individuals. The family gap among women is found to contribute 
negatively to the formation of the gender wage gap. Mothers do not receive lower wages than 
childless women, and women’s averages wages are not lower due to motherhood; instead, 
motherhood is a factor that is associated with higher wages for women, and thus it contributes 
towards decreasing the overall gender gap. In consequence, the gender wage gap in these 
countries is smaller than in other countries. As seen in Table 1, women’s employment in this 
group of countries is generally lower than in other groups, and the societal perception of 
women’s roles is highly traditional. Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) show that low female 
employment supported by traditional gender norms in these countries translates into smaller 
gender gaps via women’s selection into employment. Our results further show that the smaller 
gender wage gaps in these countries are due to the positive wage gap between mothers and 
childless women, i.e. the motherhood gap actually leads to a smaller gender gap, contrary to 
other countries. Women’s selection into employment is therefore particularly relevant to the 
positive motherhood wage gap.    
For the western EU countries in group B, the most significant contributor to the overall 
gender wage gap is the positive fatherhood wage premium. The size of the motherhood penalty 
in this group of countries varies, as does its contribution to the gender wage gap. In most 
countries belonging to this group, the relative contribution of motherhood gap to the total 
gender wage gap is greater than in the countries from group A, but smaller than in group C. As 
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seen in Table 1, the countries from group B generally provide women with institutional 
incentives to combine work and family obligations – mostly via relatively easy access to 
childcare, moderate length paid leaves, and flexible labor market employment. As a result, 
mothers return to work soon after childbirth, and are therefore not found to be in a 
disadvantaged position, i.e. they do not fall far behind childless women in their wages. The 
gender wage gap is thus not driven as much by women’s lower wages due to motherhood, as it is 
by men’s higher wages that arise due to fatherhood. The gender wage gap among childless 
individuals is also important in determining the total gender wage gap, especially in countries 
where the gender wage gap is high (countries grouped on the left). With the exception of the UK, 
these are mostly countries from Northern Europe, which are known to provide women with 
particularly generous support to aid them in combining work and family obligations.  
In the last group of countries, group C, we observe somewhat different patterns. For all 
countries, the wage penalty associated with motherhood and fatherhood, as well as the gender 
wage gap among the childless contribute to the formation of the overall gender wage gap. The 
results clearly show that the greatest gender wage gaps are seen in countries where all three 
components are positive. As opposed to results for groups A and B, the results for group C point 
to the high relative importance of both male and female wage inequalities associated with 
parenthood in shaping gender wage gap. The motherhood wage penalty plays a much greater 
role in these countries. As seen in Table 1, countries from group C provide women with very long 
child-related leaves and a low level of childcare, which explicitly supports women staying home 
and caring for their children at younger ages, as well as their return to work later on. Upon their 
return, mothers receive a wage penalty that translates into the lower mean wages of women, and 
consequently to higher gender wage gaps. In addition, similarly to other countries, men’s 
average wages are higher due to the existence of high positive wage gap between fathers and 
childless men.  
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Figure 1 
 The contributions of the family gaps among women and men,  
and the gender gap among childless to the overall gender wage gap 
 
Source: Own estimates based on EU-SILC data.  
 
5.2 MAGNITUDES AND STRUCTURE OF THE FAMILY AND GENDER GAP ESTIMATES  
We now move to the discussion of the magnitude and structure of each component of the gender 
wage gap: (1) the family gap among women; (2) the family gap among men; and (3) the gender 
wage gap among childless individuals. We present the results based on graphs that depict the 
raw gaps (represented by black bars), the gaps adjusted for demographic differences 
(represented by dark gray bars), and the gaps adjusted for demographic differences and selection 
(represented by light gray bars). Gaps that are significant at the 10% significance level are 
indicated by solid bars. The comparison of these three types of gaps allows us to hypothesize on 
the sources of the inequalities, and the role of institutions. Figure 2 depicts the estimates of the 
family gap among women by group and by decreasing magnitude within groups. The detailed 
decomposition of the components of the gaps is presented in Appendix Table A.6.  
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Figure 2 
Family gap among women 
 
Source: Own estimates based on EU-SILC data. 
 
 
For group A countries, we find positive and highly significant estimates of the raw gaps: 
working mothers receive a positive wage premium compared to working non-mothers. The gaps 
adjusted for demographics are smaller in magnitude, suggesting that working mothers are 
positively selected based on observable characteristics, and part of the raw gap is explained by 
the fact that working mothers have characteristics that are valued more highly compared to 
working childless women. As described in Section 3.2., the gap adjusted for demographics 
captures both the direct and indirect effects of policies and institutions. The indirect effects are 
realized through women’s selection into employment and motherhood. As shown by Olivetti and 
Petrongolo (2009), in Southern countries, women who work are generally highly motivated 
women who have “better” unobserved characteristics, which leads to the small overall wage 
disadvantage of women in relation to men. Because the decision regarding work is particularly 
relevant to women who have children, the positive wage gap between mothers and childless 
women may also arise as a consequence of mothers’ positive selection to work. 
Our decomposition results based on the models that correct for selection into work and 
motherhood do not, however, confirm this hypothesis, as we find larger positive wage gaps once 
we adjust for selection. There are two likely reasons behind this unexpected finding. First, as 
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noted in Section 3.1., the reliability of the results obtained from the DMF model depends on the 
exclusion restrictions used for the identification. If the variables that we use for the identification 
do not accurately capture women’s choices of labor market and motherhood status, our results 
may still be biased. Second, we correct for selection into both work and into motherhood 
simultaneously. Even if women are positively selected into work, there might also be a strong 
negative selection into motherhood, leaving us with large positive adjusted gaps. The reasons for 
this type of negative selection may be the traditional gender norms, accompanied by limited 
childcare availability, and short periods of leaves for mothers, which discourage highly motivated 
working women from having children, as they are aware that having children means they will 
drop out of the labor market for some time. The direct effects of institutions (lost experience due 
to child-related breaks, productivity decline, employer discrimination), reflected in the wage 
gaps adjusted for demographics and selection, do not appear to lead to the wage disadvantage of 
mothers. This is likely because mothers who return to work do so soon after having their child.  
The estimates obtained for group B reflect high cross-country variation in raw motherhood 
gaps, ranging from a premium of 0.05 (Belgium) to a penalty of -0.11 (United Kingdom). 
Adjusting for differences in demographics generally leads to smaller positive gaps or greater 
negative gaps. This result once again indicates that mothers have characteristics that are valued 
more highly compared to childless women. Further decomposition that additionally adjusts the 
gaps for selection based on unobservable characteristics shows that in most countries, the 
unexplained motherhood gaps are positive (they are negative only in Finland and Norway). The 
comparison of the gaps adjusted for demographics and for selection suggests that working 
mothers are negatively selected based on unobservables – a finding that is consistent with the 
results of group A. As shown in Table 1, countries in group B are characterized by high female 
employment, which makes us expect that selection is mostly related to women’s selection into 
motherhood, while selection into employment has a lower impact. Positive gaps adjusted for 
selection are particularly high in the countries where leaves are short (less than 30 weeks). These 
findings are in line with the arguments of Keck and Saraceno (2013), stating that leaves that are 
too short discourage highly motivated women who have a potential to earn high wages from 
having children.  
At the same time, the direct effects of leaves, reflected in the unexplained gaps, do not appear 
to lead to a wage disadvantage for mothers (a finding that is again consistent with the results for 
group A). The negative selection that we find means that the family gaps adjusted for 
demographics would have been lower if highly motivated working women did not restrain from 
having children, which we attribute to leaves that are too short. This is reinforced by the finding 
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of negative adjusted wage gaps in Norway and Finland - countries from group B where leaves are 
much longer, and are close to the leave lengths seen in group C. As can be seen in Figure 1, the 
selection adjustment has a different direction for these countries, and the remaining unexplained 
gaps, reflecting the direct effects of policies, are negative. Long leaves translate directly into lost 
work experience and the wage disadvantage of mothers.  
Finally, the estimates for CEE countries in Group C, show significant negative raw 
motherhood penalties, ranging from -0.06 (Romania) to -0.14 (Latvia). For most of these 
countries, a significant negative motherhood gap is present even after controlling for differences 
in observable characteristics. Contrary to what is seen in group B countries, in group C, the 
negative gaps adjusted for differences in demographics are smaller than the negative raw gaps, 
meaning that differences in demographics explain the raw gaps to some extent. The results also 
point to the different role of women’s selection into work and motherhood in determining the 
motherhood wage gap. In these countries, women’s employment rates are lower than in 
countries from group B, and cultural views are strongly traditional, so both selection into 
motherhood and into employment are likely to stand behind these findings. Two subgroups of 
countries in Group C may be distinguished with respect to the role of selection: (1) countries in 
which the selection is negative; and (2) countries in which the selection is positive. A detailed 
examination of the summary data on family policies shows that the first subgroup of countries 
consists of countries that offer particularly long leaves to mothers, exceeding 130 weeks. For the 
second subgroup, the leaves are somewhat shorter, though still relatively long.  
The negative selection seen in the first subgroup of countries with excessively long leaves 
suggests that highly motivated women are discouraged from having children by the prospects of 
having to leave the labor market for several years. Additionally, the negative selection may also 
reflect employment selection, since very long leaves are usually compensated at a lower level 
(low replacement rates). Because of financial constraints, low-ability and low paid mothers will 
thus return to work faster than mothers who can “afford” to stay on low compensated leaves. On 
the other hand, in the second subgroup of countries, where we find positive selection based on 
unobservable characteristics, leave policies have positive indirect effects on the size of the 
motherhood wage gap. Once we adjust the gaps for selection, that is, we take out the indirect 
effects of the policies from the gaps, the negative wage gaps are even greater. Long leaves - but 
not as long as in the first subgroup - lead to working mothers being a selected group that has 
better unobservable characteristics on average than other women. Irrespective of the length of 
the leaves, the adjusted gaps remain negative for almost all the countries belonging to group C, 
which points to the wage disadvantage of mothers and the negative direct effects of institutions. 
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This result indicates that because of long leaves, mothers fall behind childless women due to the 
loss of human capital during the breaks and hard to reconcile work and family obligations.  
Figure 3 depicts the family gap estimates for men. Fathers in most countries receive a 
premium compared to non-fathers, ranging from a magnitude of 0.26 (Greece, Iceland) to 0.02 
(Romania). Detailed decomposition results are presented in the Appendix (Table A.7.). The 
results show that in the majority of countries, differences in demographics between fathers and 
childless men partially explain the positive wage gap between them. The gaps, however, remain 
positive even after this adjustment. As described in Section 3.2., the gaps adjusted for 
demographics and selection reflect the inequality that results from unobserved factors such as 
culture, and particularly positive discrimination due to employers favoring fathers. Differences 
among the groups of countries with respect to cultural attitudes towards men’s role in childcare 
do not seem to correlate with the size of the fatherhood wage premium. For western European 
countries generally characterized by more egalitarian views regarding men’s roles, and for CEE 
and Southern countries that share more traditional views, we find comparable fatherhood wage 
premiums.  
Figure 3 
 Family gap among men 
 
Source: Own estimates based on EU-SILC data.  
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Figure 4 depicts the structure of the remaining component of the gender wage gap – the 
gender wage gap among individuals who do not have children - which is positive if childless men 
receive higher wages than childless women. Detailed results are presented in the Appendix 
(Table A.8.). We can see that countries with high overall gender wage gaps (Figure 1) also report 
relatively large gender wage gaps among childless individuals. Detailed decomposition results 
presented in the Appendix show that in many countries, the unexplained component of the 
gender gap among childless individuals is larger than the raw gap itself. This means that 
childless women have better observable characteristics compared to childless men, yet they earn 
less than comparable childless men. Once we adjust the gaps for selection, we are able to infer 
the direct effects of institutions, which, in the case of wage gaps among the childless, include the 
“spill-over” effects of family policies from parents to non-parents. With the exception of a few 
countries (Greece in Group A, Netherlands in Group B, and Poland and Romania in Group C), 
we find that the remaining unexplained gaps are positive. This suggests that childless women are 
penalized in the form of lower wages relative to childless men, which likely arises because of the 
institutional support to combine work and family obligations aimed at women (that is, family 
policies that are predominantly addressed to women, and not men), paired with cultural 
expectations towards women’s roles.  
Figure 4 
 Gender wage gap among childless 
 
Source: Own estimates based on EU-SILC data. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
In this study, we estimate the magnitudes of family gaps among men and women, as well as the 
gender gap among childless individuals, and assess their contribution to the overall gender wage 
gap for 26 EU countries. We use harmonized EU-SILC data and a methodology that can account 
for potential selection biases due to employment and parenthood decisions, and allows us to 
decompose the overall gender gap into these components. We analyze the resulting wage gap 
estimates and decomposition in light of relevant institutional characteristics of the countries that 
have been highlighted in previous cross-country analyses of the gender wage gap and the family 
gaps among men and women. Our study is the first to provide family gap estimates from so 
many countries using the same methodology, and to assess the cross-country variation in the 
relative roles of family gaps in shaping the overall gender wage gap. The countries in our analysis 
are categorized into three groups based on their labor market characteristics, family policies, and 
cultural norms. Family policies are evaluated based on how well they support maternal labor 
market activity and the reconciliation of work and family duties, as seen in Leitner (2003).  
We find that in Southern European countries, the main contributor to the gender gap seems 
to be the fatherhood wage gap and the gender wage gap among childless individuals. The low 
gender wage gap that is observed in these countries is a consequence of a positive wage gap 
between mothers and childless women. The fact that mothers do not receive lower wages than 
childless women means that women’s averages wages are not reduced because of motherhood. 
Our decomposition results show that the motherhood gap does not arise because of women’s 
selection to work and motherhood. Because of short leaves, mothers who return to work do so 
soon after having their child, which does not lead to the wage disadvantage of mothers.  
In Western European countries (and Slovenia), the magnitude of the motherhood wage gap 
varies, but it is not a significant contributor to the overall gender wage gap. More importantly, 
motherhood wage penalties that do not stem from observable differences between mothers and 
childless women and selection turn out to be mostly positive, which reflects a relative wage 
advantage of mothers over childless women. This is likely due to family policies, cultural norms, 
and labor market characteristics that allow mothers to better reconcile work and family 
obligations, leading to lower skill depreciation, productivity decline, and employer 
discrimination. The gender gap in these countries is mostly due to the high positive wage gaps 
between men that have children and childless men, which remain significant even after adjusting 
them for the differences in observable characteristics and selection.  
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In the CEE countries, as well as in Austria and Germany, the motherhood wage gap is 
significant, and the most important contributor to the overall gender gap in mean wages, 
alongside the gender wage gap among childless individuals and the fatherhood wage gap. We 
find that women tend to select differently into motherhood and work: in countries with very long 
leaves, women’s selection into work and motherhood is negative, whereas in countries where 
leaves are somewhat shorter though still relatively long, selection is positive. Irrespective of the 
direction of the selection, we find that mothers are faced with a wage penalty that results directly 
from unfavorable conditions for combing work with family obligations. In particular, family 
policies, labor market inflexibility, and traditional cultural norms in these countries lead to the 
long absences of mothers, and their wage disadvantage when they return. 
Overall, we find that the most important determinants of the gender wage gap vary highly 
among countries, and the analysis of these components highlights important policy 
considerations. We can see that the motherhood penalty is higher, and it contributes more 
significantly to the overall gender wage gap when policies are unsupportive of maternal 
employment, as seen in the CEE countries. Greater gender equality in these countries can only 
be achieved through family policy reforms and the significant shaping of cultural attitudes. The 
fatherhood premium is an important contributor to the gender gap in most countries. Even when 
mothers do not receive lower pay than non-mothers, they do not see the gains that fathers do 
after having a child, leading to the overall divergence of wages by gender. This difference can 
only be addressed by policies encouraging the greater involvement of fathers in childcare duties.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A. 1.  
Structure of the data by country and gender 
Country 
# 
observations 
% 
working  
% 
working 
% 
working  
% parent % parent % parent 
total total men women total men women 
Austria 32,917 0.751 0.903 0.615 0.635 0.539 0.718 
Belgium 30,201 0.774 0.853 0.699 0.609 0.514 0.696 
Bulgaria 22,022 0.704 0.745 0.663 0.648 0.534 0.760 
Czech Republic 42,407 0.777 0.910 0.652 0.671 0.541 0.786 
Denmark 29,095 0.891 0.929 0.856 0.725 0.643 0.794 
Estonia 29,396 0.733 0.783 0.684 0.727 0.611 0.836 
Finland 43,499 0.751 0.838 0.670 0.656 0.564 0.738 
France 60,010 0.798 0.877 0.723 0.671 0.590 0.744 
Germany 54,340 0.772 0.895 0.673 0.639 0.569 0.693 
Greece 33,076 0.504 0.668 0.391 0.552 0.425 0.654 
Hungary 50,669 0.689 0.782 0.602 0.638 0.523 0.745 
Iceland 16,664 0.834 0.898 0.766 0.745 0.652 0.835 
Ireland 23,253 0.644 0.729 0.577 0.636 0.527 0.721 
Italy 113,331 0.540 0.707 0.415 0.531 0.426 0.619 
Latvia 25,492 0.650 0.680 0.622 0.650 0.516 0.770 
Lithuania 21,130 0.741 0.744 0.739 0.692 0.580 0.793 
Netherlands 47,647 0.849 0.950 0.762 0.676 0.612 0.731 
Norway 31,786 0.891 0.937 0.843 0.710 0.637 0.779 
Poland 72,030 0.694 0.789 0.609 0.696 0.605 0.778 
Portugal 28,509 0.671 0.726 0.626 0.618 0.519 0.707 
Romania 26,694 0.750 0.868 0.643 0.590 0.509 0.664 
Slovenia 56,428 0.819 0.849 0.790 0.610 0.475 0.743 
Spain 83,338 0.588 0.707 0.491 0.556 0.465 0.636 
Sweden 35,404 0.889 0.922 0.857 0.705 0.645 0.760 
Slovak Republic 34,177 0.801 0.858 0.748 0.598 0.493 0.695 
United Kingdom 39,207 0.774 0.867 0.699 0.631 0.536 0.705 
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Table A. 2.  
Shares of individuals by parenthood and employment status – by country and gender  
Country 
%working 
& non-
parent 
% 
working 
& 
parent 
% not 
working 
& non-
parent 
% not 
working 
& 
parent 
%working 
& non-
parent 
% 
working 
& 
parent 
% not 
working 
& non-
parent 
% not 
working 
& 
parent 
%working 
& non-
parent 
% 
working 
& 
parent 
% not 
working 
& non-
parent 
% not 
working 
& 
parent 
total total total total men men men men women women women women 
Austria 0.310 0.442 0.053 0.196 0.393 0.510 0.059 0.037 0.235 0.380 0.047 0.338 
Belgium 0.306 0.468 0.085 0.141 0.379 0.473 0.099 0.048 0.236 0.462 0.071 0.230 
Bulgaria 0.250 0.453 0.108 0.188 0.329 0.416 0.142 0.114 0.173 0.490 0.076 0.262 
Czech Republic 0.284 0.493 0.047 0.177 0.391 0.519 0.062 0.029 0.184 0.468 0.032 0.316 
Denmark 0.234 0.657 0.038 0.071 0.300 0.629 0.043 0.028 0.172 0.684 0.033 0.111 
Estonia 0.190 0.543 0.082 0.185 0.254 0.529 0.129 0.088 0.128 0.556 0.037 0.279 
Finland 0.266 0.486 0.078 0.171 0.321 0.516 0.107 0.055 0.213 0.457 0.050 0.280 
France 0.260 0.538 0.063 0.139 0.317 0.560 0.077 0.046 0.206 0.517 0.049 0.228 
Germany 0.306 0.466 0.056 0.171 0.357 0.538 0.068 0.037 0.265 0.408 0.047 0.280 
Greece 0.231 0.274 0.207 0.288 0.335 0.333 0.261 0.071 0.158 0.233 0.170 0.439 
Hungary 0.275 0.414 0.088 0.223 0.354 0.429 0.120 0.098 0.201 0.401 0.059 0.339 
Iceland 0.199 0.635 0.045 0.121 0.266 0.632 0.060 0.042 0.127 0.639 0.028 0.206 
Ireland 0.261 0.383 0.101 0.255 0.313 0.416 0.154 0.117 0.220 0.357 0.059 0.364 
Italy 0.266 0.275 0.193 0.267 0.372 0.335 0.220 0.074 0.186 0.229 0.172 0.413 
Latvia 0.219 0.431 0.139 0.212 0.289 0.392 0.202 0.117 0.157 0.466 0.082 0.296 
Lithuania 0.199 0.543 0.109 0.150 0.249 0.496 0.163 0.092 0.152 0.587 0.058 0.204 
Netherlands 0.275 0.574 0.031 0.120 0.336 0.614 0.032 0.018 0.223 0.540 0.030 0.208 
Norway 0.251 0.641 0.035 0.073 0.306 0.631 0.040 0.023 0.192 0.651 0.031 0.127 
Poland 0.201 0.493 0.095 0.211 0.254 0.536 0.131 0.080 0.153 0.455 0.063 0.329 
Portugal 0.254 0.417 0.136 0.193 0.324 0.402 0.187 0.087 0.196 0.430 0.094 0.280 
Romania 0.326 0.424 0.085 0.164 0.408 0.460 0.085 0.047 0.251 0.392 0.086 0.271 
Slovenia 0.290 0.529 0.087 0.094 0.402 0.446 0.112 0.040 0.179 0.612 0.063 0.147 
Spain 0.278 0.311 0.157 0.255 0.351 0.356 0.194 0.099 0.218 0.273 0.126 0.383 
Sweden 0.249 0.640 0.040 0.071 0.297 0.625 0.046 0.032 0.201 0.655 0.034 0.109 
Slovak Republic 0.321 0.480 0.075 0.124 0.400 0.458 0.096 0.046 0.248 0.500 0.054 0.198 
United Kingdom 0.314 0.460 0.056 0.170 0.381 0.486 0.076 0.057 0.260 0.439 0.040 0.261 
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Table A. 3.  
Summary statistics for wage rates and working time by gender and parenthood status  
Country 
wages working time 
men women men women 
total parent childless total parent childless total parent childless total parent childless 
Austria 17.43 18.26 16.36 14.23 13.97 14.66 41.46 41.82 41.01 31.75 28.23 38.14 
Belgium 17.70 18.68 16.47 16.30 16.59 15.73 40.40 40.79 39.93 33.04 31.61 35.96 
Bulgaria 1.82 1.90 1.72 1.68 1.65 1.78 42.08 42.16 41.98 40.83 40.79 40.95 
Czech Republic 4.80 5.15 4.34 3.67 3.58 3.91 43.37 43.82 42.78 39.82 39.36 41.08 
Denmark 26.02 27.46 22.99 21.74 21.85 21.32 39.46 39.70 38.99 35.41 35.08 36.72 
Estonia 4.29 4.57 3.72 2.96 2.90 3.21 41.28 41.53 40.79 39.12 39.04 39.48 
Finland 19.40 20.99 16.85 15.68 15.78 15.45 40.14 40.32 39.86 36.60 36.26 37.39 
France 14.46 15.15 13.24 12.98 13.10 12.69 40.29 41.02 39.10 34.14 33.35 36.18 
Germany 18.10 18.97 16.76 14.40 13.91 15.15 42.41 42.65 42.05 30.48 25.57 38.89 
Greece 9.41 10.56 8.27 8.77 9.44 7.79 40.93 41.16 40.72 36.28 35.47 37.48 
Hungary 3.13 3.29 2.93 2.70 2.60 2.91 40.95 41.11 40.76 39.16 38.80 39.95 
Iceland 17.44 18.77 14.27 13.67 13.76 13.19 47.55 48.02 46.57 37.54 36.84 40.84 
Ireland 22.41 24.99 18.97 19.84 20.11 19.40 39.90 40.49 39.16 30.86 27.87 36.01 
Italy 12.46 13.28 11.72 11.40 11.68 11.05 40.69 41.18 40.26 34.31 32.56 36.45 
Latvia 3.64 3.94 3.22 3.05 2.92 3.41 42.26 42.67 41.73 39.76 39.68 40.04 
Lithuania 3.22 3.26 3.14 2.72 2.66 2.93 40.28 40.57 39.73 38.69 38.64 38.86 
Netherlands 22.85 24.68 19.50 19.79 20.11 19.03 38.14 38.22 38.01 26.47 23.41 33.40 
Norway 28.01 29.67 24.58 21.64 21.47 22.22 40.31 40.43 40.07 34.26 33.37 37.34 
Poland 3.77 4.00 3.28 3.58 3.57 3.61 43.03 43.40 42.31 38.44 38.32 38.80 
Portugal 6.72 7.23 6.08 6.22 6.10 6.49 41.61 42.18 40.86 38.45 38.27 38.86 
Romania 1.80 1.81 1.78 1.71 1.66 1.78 41.96 42.03 41.88 40.94 41.10 40.69 
Slovenia 7.87 8.62 7.04 7.28 7.22 7.47 41.18 41.34 41.01 39.81 39.71 40.11 
Spain 10.02 10.92 9.10 9.14 9.61 8.55 41.69 42.53 40.85 35.70 34.10 37.76 
Sweden 18.67 19.58 16.76 15.87 16.04 15.33 37.33 37.36 37.28 33.07 32.38 35.23 
Slovak Republic 3.64 3.75 3.52 2.92 2.81 3.12 42.46 42.83 42.06 39.93 39.61 40.56 
United Kingdom 18.31 19.64 16.60 14.68 14.42 15.12 43.60 44.02 43.07 32.80 28.77 39.99 
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Table A. 4.  
Summary statistics for key demographic variables - by gender  
Country 
Married   Age   Education (ISCED 1+2) Education (ISCED 3) Education (ISCED 4) Education (ISCED 5) 
men women men women men women men women men women men women 
Austria 0.629 0.722 36.570 36.448 0.101 0.174 0.583 0.491 0.105 0.152 0.210 0.183 
Belgium 0.653 0.726 35.945 35.945 0.194 0.187 0.373 0.314 0.041 0.034 0.393 0.465 
Bulgaria 0.533 0.719 35.385 36.074 0.200 0.225 0.627 0.489 0.009 0.003 0.164 0.283 
Czech Republic 0.587 0.766 35.160 35.475 0.046 0.059 0.786 0.756 0.009 0.015 0.160 0.170 
Denmark 0.644 0.726 37.222 37.635 0.146 0.119 0.509 0.446 0.000 0.000 0.345 0.435 
Estonia 0.511 0.651 35.633 36.699 0.182 0.108 0.598 0.449 0.042 0.082 0.177 0.362 
Finland 0.564 0.680 36.248 36.695 0.129 0.073 0.475 0.382 0.007 0.006 0.389 0.539 
France 0.510 0.589 35.995 36.224 0.160 0.178 0.499 0.431 0.001 0.002 0.339 0.389 
Germany 0.678 0.735 37.872 37.569 0.060 0.080 0.434 0.448 0.085 0.132 0.421 0.341 
Greece 0.499 0.764 35.131 35.758 0.233 0.243 0.405 0.371 0.086 0.096 0.276 0.290 
Hungary 0.552 0.712 35.288 35.753 0.160 0.175 0.618 0.518 0.048 0.046 0.174 0.261 
Iceland 0.502 0.605 35.858 36.654 0.293 0.259 0.346 0.255 0.081 0.070 0.280 0.416 
Ireland 0.568 0.638 36.017 36.154 0.282 0.223 0.244 0.258 0.077 0.117 0.396 0.402 
Italy 0.495 0.704 35.994 36.534 0.382 0.365 0.436 0.405 0.049 0.066 0.133 0.164 
Latvia 0.569 0.686 35.435 35.932 0.238 0.125 0.523 0.446 0.050 0.068 0.189 0.360 
Lithuania 0.710 0.844 36.383 37.090 0.134 0.082 0.405 0.273 0.202 0.238 0.258 0.407 
Netherlands 0.615 0.703 37.076 36.864 0.176 0.151 0.398 0.438 0.030 0.029 0.396 0.382 
Norway 0.535 0.627 36.631 36.932 0.128 0.122 0.463 0.389 0.045 0.024 0.364 0.464 
Poland 0.692 0.816 35.063 35.370 0.087 0.074 0.683 0.553 0.031 0.064 0.199 0.308 
Portugal 0.538 0.702 35.697 36.382 0.669 0.564 0.198 0.222 0.007 0.006 0.126 0.208 
Romania 0.673 0.819 35.899 36.133 0.115 0.200 0.652 0.541 0.042 0.050 0.191 0.209 
Slovenia 0.419 0.616 35.419 36.675 0.158 0.146 0.668 0.549 0.006 0.012 0.168 0.293 
Spain 0.551 0.708 35.854 36.364 0.451 0.401 0.228 0.233 0.008 0.009 0.313 0.358 
Sweden 0.500 0.585 36.266 36.530 0.087 0.068 0.505 0.442 0.082 0.055 0.326 0.435 
Slovak Republic 0.596 0.739 34.684 35.592 0.041 0.041 0.745 0.688 0.008 0.016 0.205 0.255 
United Kingdom 0.599 0.658 36.019 35.988 0.109 0.105 0.475 0.479 0.018 0.013 0.397 0.403 
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Table A. 5.  
The contributions of the family gaps and the gender gap among childless individuals to the overall gender wage gap 
Country Group 
The size of the gaps 
The absolute contribution of 
the gaps to the gender wage 
gap 
The percentage contribution 
of the gaps to the gender wag 
gap 
GWG 
Family 
gap 
women 
Family 
gap 
men 
GWG 
among 
childless 
Family 
gap 
women 
Family 
gap 
men 
GWG 
among 
childless 
Family 
gap 
women 
Family 
gap 
men 
GWG 
among 
childless 
Spain A 0.111 0.099 0.172 0.080 -0.055 0.087 0.080 -49% 78% 71% 
Italy A 0.093 0.057 0.120 0.067 -0.031 0.057 0.067 -34% 62% 72% 
Greece A 0.073 0.176 0.260 0.048 -0.105 0.130 0.048 -144% 178% 65% 
Norway B 0.264 -0.084 0.186 0.071 0.066 0.127 0.071 25% 48% 27% 
Iceland B 0.221 0.013 0.263 0.046 -0.011 0.185 0.046 -5% 84% 21% 
Sweden B 0.204 -0.021 0.138 0.094 0.016 0.093 0.094 8% 46% 46% 
UK B 0.195 -0.109 0.143 0.047 0.068 0.080 0.047 35% 41% 24% 
Finland B 0.183 0.009 0.204 0.063 -0.006 0.126 0.063 -4% 69% 35% 
Denmark B 0.166 0.018 0.176 0.061 -0.015 0.119 0.061 -9% 72% 37% 
Netherlands B 0.135 0.033 0.216 0.018 -0.024 0.141 0.018 -17% 104% 13% 
France B 0.117 0.007 0.139 0.033 -0.005 0.089 0.033 -4% 76% 28% 
Ireland B 0.112 -0.016 0.260 -0.047 0.010 0.149 -0.047 9% 133% -42% 
Portugal B 0.095 -0.094 0.120 -0.036 0.064 0.067 -0.036 68% 70% -38% 
Slovenia B 0.092 -0.065 0.158 -0.042 0.050 0.083 -0.042 55% 91% -45% 
Belgium B 0.075 0.046 0.140 0.028 -0.031 0.077 0.028 -41% 103% 38% 
Estonia C 0.354 -0.116 0.171 0.144 0.094 0.116 0.144 27% 33% 41% 
Czech Rep. C 0.260 -0.086 0.152 0.111 0.062 0.087 0.111 24% 33% 43% 
Germany C 0.243 -0.125 0.149 0.078 0.075 0.090 0.078 31% 37% 32% 
Slovak Rep. C 0.214 -0.119 0.062 0.102 0.079 0.033 0.102 37% 15% 48% 
Austria C 0.201 -0.074 0.106 0.095 0.045 0.060 0.095 23% 30% 48% 
Lithuania C 0.163 -0.096 0.027 0.070 0.075 0.018 0.070 46% 11% 43% 
Latvia C 0.162 -0.142 0.144 -0.028 0.106 0.084 -0.028 65% 52% -17% 
Hungary C 0.112 -0.100 0.089 -0.003 0.067 0.049 -0.003 59% 44% -3% 
Bulgaria C 0.089 -0.070 0.093 -0.012 0.049 0.053 -0.012 55% 59% -13% 
Poland  C 0.056 -0.003 0.171 -0.062 0.002 0.116 -0.062 3% 208% -111% 
Romania C 0.052 -0.065 0.020 0.006 0.036 0.011 0.006 70% 21% 11% 
Table A. 6.  
The decomposition results for the family gap among women 
Country Group 
Raw family gap 
among women 
Family gap among 
women adjusted 
for demographics 
Family gap women 
adjusted for 
demographics and 
selection 
The 
estimate 
of the 
gap 
Standard 
error 
The 
estimate 
of the 
gap 
Standard 
error 
The 
estimate 
of the 
gap 
Standard 
error 
Greece A 0.176 0.013 0.059 0.019 0.113 0.108 
Spain A 0.099 0.008 0.039 0.010 0.381 0.061 
Italy A 0.057 0.007 -0.004 0.009 0.181 0.051 
Belgium B 0.046 0.008 0.005 0.010 0.284 0.055 
Netherlands B 0.033 0.006 -0.019 0.008 0.151 0.047 
Denmark B 0.018 0.008 -0.050 0.010 0.081 0.054 
Iceland B 0.013 0.021 0.001 0.024 0.102 0.097 
Finland B 0.009 0.007 -0.038 0.010 -0.038 0.040 
France B 0.007 0.007 -0.023 0.009 0.050 0.048 
Ireland B -0.016 0.013 -0.036 0.016 0.430 0.135 
Sweden B -0.021 0.011 -0.092 0.014 0.041 0.048 
Slovenia B -0.065 0.008 -0.093 0.013 0.064 0.047 
Norway B -0.084 0.010 -0.129 0.014 -0.187 0.057 
Portugal B -0.094 0.014 -0.023 0.016 0.478 0.085 
United Kingdom B -0.109 0.009 -0.121 0.011 0.029 0.088 
Poland C -0.003 0.009 -0.043 0.012 -0.110 0.081 
Romania C -0.065 0.011 -0.041 0.012 -0.316 0.069 
Bulgaria C -0.070 0.015 -0.041 0.026 -0.031 0.153 
Austria C -0.074 0.010 -0.064 0.013 -0.004 0.073 
Czech Republic C -0.086 0.008 -0.023 0.012 -0.002 0.054 
Lithuania C -0.096 0.017 -0.045 0.019 -0.177 0.137 
Hungary C -0.100 0.009 -0.039 0.013 -0.097 0.063 
Estonia C -0.116 0.014 -0.038 0.019 0.094 0.116 
Slovak Republic C -0.119 0.008 -0.023 0.014 0.243 0.058 
Germany C -0.125 0.008 -0.179 0.010 -0.348 0.051 
Latvia C -0.142 0.017 -0.079 0.019 -0.225 0.170 
Notes: The raw family gap among women is the percentage mean differences in wages of mothers and 
childless women. The family gap among women adjusted for demographics is the unexplained portion 
of the raw family wage gap among women obtained from Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition based on wage 
equations estimated with the use of OLS method. The family gap women adjusted for demographics 
and selection is the unexplained portion of the raw family wage gap among women obtained from 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition based on wage equations estimated with the use of Dubin and 
McFadden’s selection correction model. 
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Table A. 7.  
The decomposition results for the family gap among men 
Country Group 
Raw family gap 
among men 
Family gap among 
men adjusted for 
demographics 
Family gap men 
adjusted for 
demographics and 
selection 
The 
estimate 
of the 
gap 
Standard 
error 
The 
estimate 
of the 
gap 
Standard 
error 
The 
estimate 
of the 
gap 
Standard 
error 
Greece A 0.260 0.011 0.063 0.018 0.596 0.064 
Spain A 0.172 0.006 0.076 0.009 0.374 0.034 
Italy A 0.120 0.006 0.038 0.008 0.270 0.031 
Iceland B 0.263 0.016 0.164 0.020 0.300 0.056 
Ireland B 0.260 0.013 0.117 0.019 0.701 0.067 
Netherlands B 0.216 0.006 0.095 0.008 0.278 0.032 
Finland B 0.204 0.007 0.073 0.009 0.346 0.029 
Norway B 0.186 0.009 0.082 0.014 0.202 0.041 
Denmark B 0.176 0.008 0.068 0.009 0.256 0.048 
Slovenia B 0.158 0.006 0.074 0.010 0.414 0.028 
United Kingdom B 0.143 0.010 0.075 0.012 0.517 0.043 
Belgium B 0.140 0.007 0.068 0.009 0.198 0.033 
France B 0.139 0.006 0.049 0.008 0.273 0.023 
Sweden B 0.138 0.008 0.059 0.012 0.238 0.033 
Portugal B 0.120 0.013 0.042 0.019 0.192 0.069 
Poland C 0.171 0.007 0.092 0.011 0.597 0.046 
Estonia C 0.171 0.011 0.185 0.016 0.267 0.058 
Czech Republic C 0.152 0.006 0.079 0.009 0.189 0.026 
Germany C 0.149 0.007 0.044 0.009 0.242 0.031 
Latvia C 0.144 0.015 0.117 0.019 0.239 0.074 
Austria C 0.106 0.009 0.041 0.011 0.232 0.032 
Bulgaria C 0.093 0.011 0.055 0.020 0.116 0.068 
Hungary C 0.089 0.008 0.042 0.011 0.139 0.035 
Slovak Republic C 0.062 0.008 0.056 0.011 0.140 0.033 
Lithuania C 0.027 0.015 0.045 0.019 0.295 0.081 
Romania C 0.020 0.009 0.045 0.010 0.154 0.046 
Notes: The raw family gap among men is the percentage mean differences in wages of fathers and 
childless men. The family gap among men adjusted for demographics is the unexplained portion of 
the raw family wage gap among men obtained from Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition based on wage 
equations estimated with the use of OLS method. The family gap men adjusted for demographics 
and selection is the unexplained portion of the raw family wage gap among men obtained from 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition based on wage equations estimated with the use of Dubin and 
McFadden’s selection correction model. 
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Table A. 8.  
The decomposition results for the gender wage gap among childless individuals 
Country Group 
Raw gender wage 
gap among 
childless 
individuals 
Gender wage gap 
among childless 
individuals 
adjusted for 
demographics 
Gender wage gap 
among childless 
individuals 
adjusted for 
demographics and 
selection 
The 
estimate 
of the 
gap 
Standard 
error 
The 
estimate 
of the 
gap 
Standard 
error 
The 
estimate 
of the 
gap 
Standard 
error 
Spain A 0.080 0.007 0.076 0.009 0.180 0.027 
Italy A 0.067 0.007 0.038 0.008 0.061 0.028 
Greece A 0.048 0.012 0.063 0.018 -0.048 0.060 
Sweden B 0.094 0.011 0.059 0.012 0.088 0.037 
Norway B 0.071 0.012 0.082 0.014 0.095 0.041 
Finland B 0.063 0.008 0.073 0.009 0.086 0.027 
Denmark B 0.061 0.010 0.068 0.009 0.069 0.043 
United Kingdom B 0.047 0.010 0.075 0.012 0.140 0.035 
Iceland B 0.046 0.023 0.164 0.020 0.232 0.065 
France B 0.033 0.007 0.049 0.008 0.025 0.023 
Belgium B 0.028 0.008 0.068 0.009 0.089 0.035 
Netherlands B 0.018 0.007 0.095 0.008 -0.024 0.028 
Portugal B -0.036 0.015 0.042 0.019 0.269 0.061 
Slovenia B -0.042 0.008 0.074 0.010 0.032 0.031 
Ireland B -0.047 0.013 0.117 0.019 0.054 0.065 
Estonia C 0.144 0.015 0.185 0.016 0.285 0.066 
Czech Republic C 0.111 0.008 0.079 0.009 0.287 0.029 
Slovak Republic C 0.102 0.009 0.056 0.011 0.194 0.028 
Austria C 0.095 0.010 0.041 0.011 0.106 0.038 
Germany C 0.078 0.008 0.044 0.009 0.092 0.025 
Lithuania C 0.070 0.019 0.045 0.019 0.116 0.090 
Romania C 0.006 0.011 0.045 0.010 -0.024 0.037 
Hungary C -0.003 0.009 0.042 0.011 0.076 0.029 
Bulgaria C -0.012 0.015 0.055 0.020 0.073 0.069 
Latvia C -0.028 0.019 0.117 0.019 0.140 0.107 
Poland C -0.062 0.010 0.092 0.011 -0.066 0.041 
Notes: The raw gender wage gap among childless individuals is the percentage mean differences in wages of 
childless men and childless women. The gender wage gap among childless individuals adjusted for 
demographics is the unexplained portion of the raw gender wage gap among childless individuals obtained from 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition based on wage equations estimated with the use of OLS method. The gender 
wage gap among childless individuals adjusted for demographics and selection is the unexplained portion of the 
raw gender wage gap among childless individuals obtained from Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition based on wage 
equations estimated with the use of Dubin and McFadden’s selection correction model. 
 
 
